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 13 
In our recent meta-analysis on antibiotic ecotoxicity data published in 14 
Environment International (Le Page et al. 2017)  we suggest that because of the 15 
great diversity in species sensitivity, environmental risk assessment (ERA) 16 
would be improved by testing a more diverse range of bacteria (including both 17 
environmental bacteria and clinically relevant bacteria (CRB)). We also conclude 18 
that tests on antibiotics should consider endpoints of relevance to ecosystem 19 
function. Comparing the protection goals for environmental heath with those for 20 
human health (protection against antimicrobial resistance (AMR) development) 21 
we, furthermore, identify that neither protection goal is always protective of the 22 
other whilst using current methodologies (with surrogate endpoints for each 23 
goal and very limited bacterial biodiversity tested); supporting the need for both 24 
in any comprehensive health protection system for antibiotics. 25 
 26 
In a correspondence to our paper Bengtsson-Palme and Larsson (2018) point 27 
out a bias in our sensitivity analysis favouring environmental bacteria  (including 28 
cyanobacteria). We acknowledge this, but equally in this correspondence we 29 
challenge some of their points made on how this impacts on the significance of 30 
our data. We also address points relating to the lack of clarity on protection goals 31 
for antibiotics in the discussion of our paper and discuss what data are most 32 
suitable for establishing those protection goals.  We emphasise that the main 33 
conclusion drawn from our original paper has not changed and we maintain that 34 
a holistic approach including both environmental health and resistance selection 35 
is required to drive an effective overall protection limit for antibiotics. 36 
 37 
Sensitivity analyses skews 38 
Bengtsson-Palme and Larsson (2018) rightfully point out that our analysis skews 39 
the apparent sensitivity in favour of the environmental bacteria because the 40 
endpoints compared for CRB (minimum inhibitory concentrations, MIC) and 41 
environmental bacteria (no observed effect concentrations, NOEC) for growth 42 
inhibition are derived from different ends of the dose response curve; MICs are 43 
derived from the top of the dose-response curve (full inhibitory effect on 44 
growth) and the NOECs for environmental bacteria from the bottom of the 45 
response curve (concentration with no inhibition). In some cases therefore CRB 46 
may be more sensitive than environmental bacteria than our analysis suggests. 47 
However, it should be highlighted that this doesn’t necessarily mean that 48 
environmental bacteria will not represent the most sensitive taxa for individual 49 
antibiotics. This is because, in the first instance, in the cases where 50 
environmental bacteria were more sensitive by an order of magnitude or more 51 
compared with CRB in our analysis, environmental bacteria are likely to be 52 
comparable, if not more sensitive to those antibiotics. In our meta analysis this 53 
would be the case for 6 out of 24 antibiotics (including azithromycin and 54 
ampicillin).  Secondly, very large differences in sensitivity can occur between 55 
different species of bacteria (our meta analysis showed sensitivity spanned five 56 
orders of magnitude in 8 species cyanobacteria exposed to ampicillin) and 57 
because of the far greater species number and diversity tested in CRB compared 58 
with environmental bacteria there is likely to be a sensitivity bias in favour of 59 
CRB. The size-adjusted MIC value used as our comparative endpoint for CRB was 60 
calculated from the MICs of up to 70 species in up to 5 families (Bengtsson-Palme 61 
and Larsson 2016). In stark contrast to CRB, cyanobacteria antibiotic test data 62 
were generally derived from only one or two species giving far greater 63 
uncertainty in the sensitivity calculation for this group.  64 
 65 
Uncertainty in protection targets. 66 
ERA for antibiotics in the European Union is legislated by the Medicinal Products 67 
for Human Use directive (EC 2001) where the protection goal is to prevent “any 68 
risk of undesirable effects on the environment”. Current practice is to calculate a 69 
PNEC using chronic growth and/or reproduction data on single species, which 70 
for antibiotics is normally based on the PNECSW driven by a cyanobacterium. The 71 
relationship however, between individual species sensitivity, ecosystem function 72 
and functional redundancy is not well understood (Antwis et al. 2017) and what 73 
constitutes an “undesirable effect” is unclear.  As Bengtsson-Palme and Larsson 74 
(2018) point out, clarity is, therefore, required in the definition and objectives of 75 
these protection goals.  The issue of functional redundancy, and to what extent it 76 
is possible to eradicate or lose a microbial species without compromising that 77 
ecosystem function is a hugely important consideration for environmental 78 
protection. There is some evidence that microbial communities may be less 79 
functionally redundant than macroorganism communities (Delgado-Baquerizo et 80 
al. 2016).  Thus, although we re-iterate our support of the inclusion of ecosystem 81 
function based tests, given the uncertainties relating to functional redundancy, at 82 
this time ecosystem level protection may be best served by a conservative 83 
protection goal based upon bacterial biodiversity (and therefore inherently 84 
ecosystem function). 85 
 86 
Bengtsson-Palme and Larsson (2018), highlight that the risk of AMR and human 87 
health concerns are generally the main driving force for antibiotic protection 88 
goals but they also agree with our conclusions that a holistic approach that 89 
considers both environmental health and AMR should be taken. The meta 90 
analysis shows that for some antibiotics the environmental protection limits may 91 
be lower than the protection limits predicted for AMR (using current 92 
methodologies and surrogate endpoints for biodiversity and AMR). To illustrate 93 
this, here (Fig 1) we compare the PNECr determined using the size-adjusted MIC 94 
data (Bengtsson-Palme and Larsson 2016) and PNECsw calculated from the 95 
lowest NOEC in our meta analysis with the PNECfw (PNEC in freshwater) 96 
determined for the 5 antibiotics in the European commission environmental 97 
quality standards watch list (Carvalho et al. 2015).  In each case the PNECr 98 
represents the highest PNEC for each antibiotic (i.e. is least protective as a 99 
whole). 100 
 101 
Fig 1.  Predicted no effect concentrations (PNEC) for the antibiotics in the European commission 102 
watch list under the environmental quality standards directive (Carvalho et al. 2015).  PNECfw is 103 
the PNEC that is determined for freshwater in the European commission directive (Note that the 104 
assessment factor for PNECfw may be up to 50 rather than 10 in these examples due to the lack of 105 
a full phase II base set of data – algae/cyanobacteria, invertebrates and fish (EMA 2006). The 106 
PNECfw for ciprofloxacin is thus most likely overprotective); PNECr is the PNEC calculated from 107 
minimum inhibitory concentrations (Bengtsson-Palme and Larsson 2016); PNECsw is the PNEC 108 
determined from the lowest, publically available, environmental bacteria no observed effect 109 
concentration (Le Page et al. 2017). PNECsw uses an assessment factor of 10 for each antibiotic. 110 
 111 
As Bengtsson-Palme and Larsson (2018) point out, protection against antibiotic 112 
pollution for environmental health is more of a localised impact, whereas AMR 113 
has a wider and more pervasive global significance, directing stakeholders 114 
towards the need for two different protection targets determined from 115 
appropriate data and methodologies.  We still maintain however, that an overall 116 
protection limit should protect both environmental and human health. 117 
Environmental protection and associated legislation differs across countries, but 118 
equally there is a social responsibility to ensure that product provenance is 119 
conducted to the highest possible levels. 120 
 121 
Discharge limit 122 
In response to stakeholder calls to address the risk of antibiotics released from 123 
manufacturing operations, which currently sits outside of the regulatory ERA 124 
framework, in our original paper we proposed an interim production discharge 125 
limit of 100 ng/L for each antibiotic, to be applied in the mixing zone to both 126 
protect environmental bacteria populations and reduce the risk of AMR 127 
development.  This interim limit recognised that (i) because most antibiotics 128 
were authorised before the current guidelines came into force, many either lack 129 
or have very limited ecotoxicology data, and (ii) the need to establish science-130 
based limits in the absence of such data.  We were explicit in our paper to point 131 
out, however, that as sufficient data become available for mode of action relevant 132 
species we support the use of higher or lower protection limits based on these 133 
empirical data. Bengtsson-Palme and Larsson (2018) questioned this 134 
conservative limit for antibiotics because it may incur higher manufacturing 135 
costs through the need for infrastructure investment to reduce discharges and 136 
based on the fact that some antibiotics have relatively low toxicity and do not 137 
exert a strong selection pressure for antibiotic resistance.  These are important 138 
points to debate.  A single interim value helps the pharmaceutical industry, many 139 
of whom are currently reviewing their antibiotic manufacturing operations, to 140 
prioritise interventions and actions.  These interventions may include generating 141 
relevant environmental toxicology data where empirical data does not exist or 142 
when a possible risk is identified at a site. A single value will also enable the 143 
pharmaceutical industry to benchmark existing suppliers more effectively to 144 
identify best practice in waste management.  The requirement for infrastructure 145 
investments, as highlighted by Bengtsson-Palme and Larsson (2018), represents 146 
a last resort and these would only be required where risks could not be refined 147 
and managed through other interventions.  Where infrastructure upgrades are 148 
required to meet scientifically robust limits, then the costs of these upgrades will 149 
need to be evaluated and justified as part of a wider socio-economic assessment 150 
into the stewardship of antimicrobial chemotherapy.  In most cases, however, 151 
these interventions are not likely to incur excessive costs; the manual wipe down 152 
of equipment prior to cleaning washes, separation and incineration of the 153 
wastewater from the first wash of equipment, or the installation of inline filters 154 
to remove undissolved material can all significantly reduce environmental 155 
concentrations of APIs, in most cases by >90% (Hargreaves et al. 2017).  The 156 
logistics for antibiotic supply can be extremely complex with many suppliers 157 
manufacturing a whole range of antibiotics for numerous contractors and there 158 
can be language barriers and many suppliers lack the expertise to determine safe 159 
concentrations for themselves. In this case the use of a single interim limit has 160 
practical as well as scientific value.  It may help remove conflicting limits (e.g. 161 
where two contractors provide different safe values or no level of protection), 162 
and minimise confusion amongst the pharmaceutical industry and their 163 
suppliers in the absence of data.   164 
 165 
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